(1) The existence of this sentence is logically inevitable.
Is so relative to itself in the context of its (necessarily) possible definition...
But isn’t the definition contingent?
What we require is that in every possible world it is possible that (1) exists. But it is probably better not to use possible-worlds semantics at all. Then, (it would have to be argued) this possibility might have an ontological status indistinguishable from actual “self-apparent” existence. […]
So why wouldn’t every self-referential sentence exist? Compare (1) to
(2) This sentence does not exist.
To the extent (1) is true, (2) is false, but they exist equally. So the truth of the sentence does not seem to affect its existence. Therefore, it would be hard to argue that content makes any difference to a sentence’s existence.
Nuts.
Can you see any way around it?
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